At the international level, a proactive response is anticipated to be taken by the prime target of terrorist attacks, insofar as this nation derives greater benefits from such actions (Arce and Sandler 2004 Proactive operations that bomb alleged terrorist assets, hold suspects without charging them, assassinate suspected terrorists, curb civil freedoms, or impose retribution on alleged sponsors may have a downside by creating more grievances in reaction to heavy-handed tactics or unintended collateral damage. Such operations can lose government support and thereby empower terrorists through more favorable world opinion and a larger constituency.
Consequently, proactive measures may promote recruitment to the terrorist network, thus offsetting some of the favorable effects. At the transnational level, recruitment represents a public bad that may impact countries differently depending on their relationship with the proactive country. This recruitment depends not only on the terrorist success in an event, where success encourages recruitment, but also on the nature of the event -i.e., a normal event with a modest impact or a spectacular event with a high death toll or a symbolic nature. Spectaculars grab headlines and remain in the public's consciousness long after the event. The term "spectaculars" is used officially and in the literature to describe influential terrorist attacks. Such events further recruitment to the terrorist group.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a government's proactive decision when it may not only harm the terrorist group by limiting its ability, but also help the group attract recruits and legitimacy. This tradeoff epitomizes the liberal democratic dilemma in responding to a terrorist threat -a government that responds by too little appears unable to protect its citizens and loses popular support, while a government that responds by too much appears tyrannical and encourages opposition (Wilkinson 2001) . Major proactive campaigns may actually promote large-scale or newsworthy spectaculars if the recruitment consequence of repressive actions is sufficiently strong; thus, too much reliance on offensive actions may result in a disastrous outcome. Because such spectaculars can occur anywhere owing to the globalization of terrorism, the collateral damage from excessive measures may take place half a world away from the nation whose actions incited the grievance and recruitment. As such, proactive operations are best understood as generating both public benefits and costs. A secondary, but related, purpose is to contrast the US approach following 9/11 with that of the European Union (EU). The former tries to eliminate the terrorist risk through a "war on terror," while the latter manages the risk with greater reliance on defensive actions.
BASIC GAME SET UP
The underlying game is played by two players: a target government (E) and a terrorist group (T). In Figure 1 , the game is displayed with the corresponding payoffs at the game's four possible outcomes. The target government moves first and chooses a proactive level,
followed by the terrorists who choose the type of attack -spectacular (s) or normal (n). Nature then determines the outcome based in part on the proactive response. Airports on 27 December 1985) are also spectaculars with lasting impacts. Although spectaculars yield a higher payoff to the terrorists than a normal event, spectaculars have a smaller success probability, ( ), s π θ than a normal event, whose success probability is ( ). 
At the four endpoints in the game tree of Figure 1 , the payoffs of the government and the terrorists are displayed with the government's payoffs listed above those of the terrorists. If a spectacular is successful, then the government loses both S and the cost of its proactive response.
The cost of a proactive measure is analogous to an insurance premium, paid in all states of the world; thus, ( ) P θ is part of the government's loss in all four outcomes. For successful spectaculars, the terrorists gain S plus a recruitment benefit of ss c θ , positively dependent on the proactive effort. The marginal recruitment benefit from a successful spectacular is ss c .
Although the terrorists gain what the government loses, the game is not zero-sum because of the second term in the two payoffs. If, however, the spectacular fails, the government just loses its Munich Olympics attack, the Black September terrorists failed when the West German police opened fire in a rescue attempt at Fürstenfeldbruck airbase prior to the terrorists boarding a Lufthansa Boeing 727 to take them and the hostages to Cairo. Despite Black September's failure to achieve any of its demands or to escape the scene, the Munich incident resulted in "thousands of Palestinians" rushing to join the terrorist organization in the weeks that followed (Hoffman 1998, 71) .
We now turn to the two sets of payoffs at the bottom right of the game tree, corresponding to a normal event's success and failure. For success, the government loses N and its proactive costs, where S > N because a normal event has a smaller associated loss than a spectacular event. The terrorists gain N plus a recruitment benefit of sn c θ . The marginal recruitment gain associated with a successful normal incident is less than that associated with a successful spectacular -i.e., . 
BASELINE MODEL: NO RECRUITMENT
To highlight the influence of recruitment on the analysis, we first present the case where there is no recruitment, which comes the closest to the literature, except that we consider the terrorists' choice between spectaculars and normal events. ( ) ( )
where is the terrorists' expected utility, which equals
This last inequality follows from the no-recruitment payoffs and the relevant success To complete the search for a subgame perfect equilibrium, we now turn to the government's choice of proactive measures, conditioned on the terrorists' choice of events. The
which can be rewritten as
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 6 associated with the top problem in equation (6) 
The bottom portion of equation (6) involves a subgame perfect equilibrium where the terrorists choose a normal event and the government chooses a proactive level,
If, therefore, the government wants to limit spectaculars, then it must choose a sufficiently large θ and proactive operations are insufficient to prevent spectaculars. Without recruitment, we find that sufficient governmental offense eliminates spectaculars by weakening the terrorists so they must engage in more modest operations. In the absence of empowerment and recruitment, there cannot be too much of a good thing because proactive campaigns do not incite greater terrorism. If the government just wants to eliminate spectaculars, then it equates θ to θ to save on proactive costs. The reason that this is not necessarily the subgame perfect equilibrium is that the government also limits its expected losses through its proactive response;
hence, its optimal choice of θ may lie well to the right of θ as proactive costs are traded off against reduced losses from fewer attacks. The likelihood of spectaculars are low when θ lies near to . θ
PROACTIVE CHOICES WITH RECRUITMENT
Now we return to the game tree and allow the terrorists' payoffs at three of the outcomes to include marginal recruitment benefits ( ) 
, ma x 1
Recruitment has not altered the government objective from that of equation (6), but it has altered the regions that determine the type of event. The subgame perfect equilibria to the game with recruitment can be completely specified for all values of the exogenous parameters as follows: between θ and θ and the terrorists responding with a normal event. When the marginal costs, p, of proactive measures are low, a rational government may choose a proactive level above , θ hoping to make the likelihood of a successful spectacular small. Unfortunately, rational terrorists would choose a spectacular event owing to anticipated recruitment benefits. For S rp θ = between 1 and θ , the terrorists again engage in spectaculars, because they have a relatively high success probability. The government must anticipate the terrorists' derived payoffs especially from recruitment in order not to respond to such a degree that the terrorists are pushed to execute spectaculars with potentially disastrous outcomes. In terms of a proactive campaign, there can be too much of a good thing when it creates grievances and swells terrorists'
ranks. There can also be too little proactive measures when recruitment is not significant so that the pure publicness of such actions is the main consideration. Hence, governments must choose an offensive that is neither excessive nor insufficient if spectaculars are to be avoided.
SOME COMPARATIVE STATICS
Suppose that the relative difficulty of spectaculars increases so n π exceeds s π by a larger amount. This is captured by an increase in r, which has two effects in German Grenzschutzgruppe Neun (GSG-9) -that raised r. prevalent. This outcome arises from the lower success probability associated with spectaculars.
An increase in S -the payoff from spectaculars in the absence of recruitment gainsraises the vertical intercept of the parabola and augments the range of spectaculars. This agrees with the earlier result regarding S when there is no recruitment; thus, the spectacular region expands with gains to a spectacular's success, regardless of recruitment.
The final comparative static change concerns an increase in L or the terrorists' loss from failed spectaculars. Taking a partial derivative of the parabola with respect to L, we get:
In Figure 3 , an increase in L augments the vertical intercept of the parabola, but shifts the parabola down and to the right so the normal range expands.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Target countries have different abilities to counter terrorism, which affect their marginal proactive costs (p). To put things in perspective, we assume that one country -say, the United States (US) -has a lower p than another target -say, the EU -but are identical in terms of other parameters. This cost difference may stem from the US having better technology or intelligence to counter terrorism. Ceteris paribus, a low p encourages a larger proactive response. This scenario is depicted in Figure 4 for the parabola and straight line whose intersection delineates normal events for
θ θ θ ∈ from spectaculars outside these bounds. In Figure 4 , the small p for the US encourages sufficient proactive measures to trigger a spectacular owing to terroristperceived recruitment gains. In contrast, the EU's high p limits its proactive operations and results in a normal event.
If the United States places a high value on terrorism-related losses (S) from a spectacular, or the terrorists value comparable US losses over those from other countries, then this also raises the level of US proactive measures by raising S, thus increasing the likelihood of spectaculars against US interests. Targets such as the World Trade Center (WTC) had a high S value owing to the potential loss of life, its symbol of US dominance in globalization, and its potential financial consequences. Given the failed attempt in 1993 to bring down the north tower of the WTC, the S value was particularly high.
In fact, the scenario depicted in Figure 4 appears to capture US and EU reactions following 9/11. Because US losses from 9/11 far exceeded those of any other country, the Bush administration and the American public clearly put very high values on future lossesunderstandably, S increased in relation to that of countries less harmed by 9/11. This characterization of US perceptions is consistent with survey findings reported by Davis and Silver (2004) in which Americans felt sufficiently threatened after 9/11 to sacrifice some civil liberties for greater security. US superiority in military power and intelligence compared with other target countries also made for a relatively low p. Past and current US efforts to secure its borders and guard against terrorist attacks lowered p relative to other countries, which increased US proactive response and promoted further spectaculars -e.g., the attempted shoe bombing by Unlike most European countries, the US defense budget grew greatly following 9/11. A recent study of the composition of terrorist events indicates that the proportion of deadly bombings has increased greatly since 9/11 and the subsequent US-led war on terror (Enders and Sandler 2004) .
This suggests that a greater reliance on proactive operations may be encouraging deadlier attacks.
There is an interesting transnational externality associated with our analysis. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
If proactive measures are cheap or if the perceived costs of future attacks are high, the subgame perfect equilibrium may involve a targeted government engaging in relatively large amounts of proactive operations that induce terrorists to resort to occasional spectaculars to tap into recruitment benefits. Unquestionably, the experience of 9/11 raised S for the United States, whose marginal proactive costs are relatively low compared with other countries. Since 9/11, the relatively large US proactive campaign is consistent with the model presented and may be excessive from a global standpoint as transference externalities imposed on other countries are not taken into account when the United States decides its proactive options. As a consequence, there may indeed be too much proactive operations with unintended fall-out.
Although this paper has focused on a two-player game between the terrorists and a targeted state, an n-player game underlies proactive decisions where players consist of the 1 n − possible target nations and the terrorist network. In choosing their proactive measures, the 2. Spending on terrorist-related intelligence is not available.
3. This analysis differs from Sandler and Arce (2003) , which only allowed for a discrete choice of preemption but permitted a three-player interaction involving two targeted governments and a terrorist group. 
